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IT is difficult to imagine a presentation on the subject of research and
experimentation or, afortiori, consent, that fails to pay homage to the history
and structure of the tort law doctrine of informed consent. Any torts lawyer
in attendance would be captivated by the possibility of linkage between the tort
doctrine of informed consent and the self-determination/autonomy debate.
However, caution should be exercised before pressing that linkage too far.
When bio-ethicists discuss consent they relate it to autonomy. In contrast, the
tort doctrine of informed consent is dominated by allocational rationales and
structures. Caution is necessary lest informed consent escape from its footnote
status to deflect bio-ethicists and the autonomy debate into far shallower
waters.
Now, this is hardly new territory. Professor Katz, that champion of self-
determination, has been less than enthused by the current state of informed
consent law.' Indeed, Katz, writing in 1984, made his dissatisfaction evident
by noting that the common law doctrine of informed consent "has secured for
patients the right to better custody but not to liberty."2
If anything, Katz's position is somewhat generous. A more extreme
critique might challenge whether the doctrine of informed consent as we know
it today has any relevance to the modem bio-ethical debate on autonomy. At
the very least, it may be argued that tort law has made little progress since the
"converted battery" cases of the 1960s and 1970s,3 and has been noticeably
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1. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 48-84 (1984) [hereinafter
SILENT WORLD]. See also Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law's Vision, 39 U.
PITT. L. REV. 137 (1977).
2. SILENT WORLD, supra note 1, at 49.
3. Converted battery cases are those transitional cases in which the courts moved the battery
(with vitiated consent) cause of action into negligence. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal.
1972); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Cf. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W.
12, 16 (1905) (physician performing operation on patient's left ear liable for battery when patient
only consented to surgery on right ear); see also infra notes 6, 9 and accompanying text.
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deficient in developing any coherent body of law regulating and improving the
flow of information between parties who suffer radically disparate information
costs. Such a hypothesis references three arguments. First, Katz's basic
critique of informed consent is re-emphasized. Second, the inability of torts
lawyers to separate the "informed" aspect of the doctrine from the "consent"
aspect is viewed as an important obstacle in the development of the informa-
tion torts. Third, note is taken of the unease with which tort doctrine has
addressed the related area of wrongful life, an area in which the converted
battery paradigm seems particularly inappropriate.
II. INFORMED CONSENT CASES
With the exception of Professor Katz,4 just about every other historian of
informed consent has paid extravagant homage to Judge Cardozo's opinion
in Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y Hospital.5 In Schloendorff Cardozo
apparently cemented the link between tort law doctrine and autonomy with his
comment that "[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right
to determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who
performs an operation without his patient's consent, commits an assault, for
which he is liable in damages."6
For Katz, however, the subsequent developments of the informed consent
doctrine are distinguished by retreat: "[Jiudges have made impassioned pleas
for patient self-determination, and then have undercut them by giving
physicians considerable latitude to practice according to their own lights
... Much of the discussion by Katz focuses on the doctrine's primary
operational rule of adequacy and the question whether to use a "need-to-know"
patient-oriented standard or a physician-sourced, custom-based standard of
disclosure. Katz's critique was and remains sound.8 However, the challenge
may be made on more fundamental grounds.
4. SILENT WORLD, supra note 1, at 51-52.
5. 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914).
6. Id. at 93.
7. SILENT WORLD, supra note 1, at 49.
8. See. e.g., the discussion in Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504 (N.J. 1988), and the
conclusion that:
Perhaps the strongest consideration that influences our decision in favor of the "prudent
patient" standard lies in the notion that the physician's duty of disclosure "arises from
phenomena apart from medical custom and practice": the patient's right of self-
determination. The foundation for the physician's duty to disclose in the first place is
found in the idea that "it is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine
for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie." In contrast the arguments for
the "professional" standard smack of an anachronistic paternalism that is at odds with any
strong conception of a patient's right of self-determination.
Id. at 509 (citations omitted).
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For example, it is arguable that informed consent was adopted not out of
any sense that it would better promote autonomy, but because of essentially
internal tort structure concerns that the tort of battery was being distorted.9
Looking back it is now tempting to inquire whether autonomy, as it was
voiced in those early cases," was put forward'as the genuine rationale for the
new doctrine of informed consent, or whether it was merely a convenient
notion-an attractive philosophical and ethical symbol or benchmark at which
to nod in passing.
Of course, there can be no disagreement with Katz's observations
concerning the continuing contemporary retreat from any informed consent
which would fully promote self-determination, a retreat evidenced by the
passage of state legislation tending to adopt the less rigorous custom rule for
judging adequacy of risk disclosure." Involving informed consent doctrine
in medical malpractice "crisis" legislation reflects a physician and hospital
mentality focusing on the minimum required or bottom line to avoid
liability-in contrast to the more attractive and enlightened goals noted by
Katz." Indeed, it is important to see how "tort think" has distorted the
growth of informed consent and demoted it into just another issue in the
panoply of risk management.
In tort law, the symbolic appeal to self-determination has long been
forgotten. In its stead, torts lawyers have developed a far less inspiring
decisional tree. First, they inquire, is this a "no-consent" case or a "lack of
informed consent" case? Second, if. it is of the latter species, torts lawyers
pose the jurisdiction-sensitive question of whether a patient standard or a
physician standard should be applied in measuring the appropriate level of
disclosure.
The answer to the first question determines whether the case will be
brought in intentional tort or negligence. If it is a "no-consent" case, the
9. See, e.g., Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972):
The battery theory should be reserved for those circumstances when a doctor performs an
operation to which the patient has not consented. When the patient gives permission to
perform one type of treatment and the doctor performs another, the requisite element of
deliberate intent to deviate from the consent given is present. However, when the patient
consents to certain treatment and the doctor performs that treatment but an undisclosed
inherent complication with a low probability occurs, no intentional deviation from the
consent given appears; rather, the doctor in obtaining consent may have failed to meet his
due care duty to disclose pertinent information. In that situation the action should be
pleaded in negligence.
Cf. Mink v. Univ. of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 717 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (battery action where
plaintiffs not told they were part of an experiment).
10. Most are discussed by Katz. See SILENT WORLD, supra note 1, at 60-80.
11. Id. at 81-82.
12. See, e.g., id. at 83-84 (these goals include doctor-patient interaction in the decision
making process, focusing on process and self-determination).
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former battery applies; if it is a "lack of informed consent" case, negligence
applies as the regulatory mechanism.13 But why do torts lawyers make this
distinction? One thing is sure: autonomy considerations are not involved.
According to a representative Wisconsin court, the reasons why battery
doctrine is not applicable to "lack of informed consent" cases include the
following:
First, the act complained of in these cases simply does not fit comfortably
within the traditional concepts of battery-the intent to unlawfully touch the
person of another. In cases such as the instant one, physicians are invariably
acting in good faith and for the benefit of the patient .... Second .... the
failure to inform a patient is probably not, in the usual case, an intentional act
and hence not within the traditional concept of intentional torts. Third, the act
complained of in informed consent cases is not within the traditional idea of
"contact" or "touching." In the typical situation, as here, the physician
impeccably performs the surgery or other treatment . ... Fourth, a valid
question exists with respect to whether a physician's malpractice insurance
covers liability for an arguably criminal act-battery. If not, it may be asked
why a physician should be required to pay out of his own pocket for what is
essentially an act of 'negligence-failing to inform a patient of the risks
indigenous to the treatment? Fifth, these essentially negligence cases do not
fit the traditional mold of situations wherein punitive damages can be
awarded. 14
This meta-doctrinal laundry list is important not for what it says but for
what it omits. Where, for example, are the concerns about competing goals
of medical professionalism and autonomy? The answer is that they are simply
not reflected here. Rather, these criteria disclose a decisional system
dominated by allocational and structural concerns.
On to the second question: If we have an informed consent case, are we
going to apply a patient standard or a physician standard? So stated, we
appear to have identified the torts analog to the core of the bio-ethical
debate. 5 But does this analog truly possess the same content? The dominant
purpose in the torts debate is to come up with the operational rule most suited
to the degree of loss reallocation that a court wishes to adopt' 6-it lacks or
minimizes the ethical component in the bio-ethicists' consent debate. While
bio-ethicists examine the intrinsics of the competing standards of disclosure,
13. A battery cause of action is available when the physician fails to disclose to the patient
the nature and character of the operation to be performed, in that the patient's consent under such
circumstances is invalid; a negligent nondisclosure action is available when the patient is apprised
of the nature of the operation but the physician fails to explain the risks of the procedure.
Kohoutek v. Hafner, 383 N.W.2d 295, 298-99 (Minn. 1986).
14. Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973) (footnotes omitted).
15. Jay Katz, Human Experimentation and Human Rights, 38 ST. Louis U. L.J. 7 (1993).
16. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Collapsing Torts, 25 CONN. L. REv. 717, 718-22 (1993).
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torts lawyers use them as little more than conclusory labels applied to
allocational models.
I. INFORMED CONSENT AND INFORMATION TORTS
The further we move away from the paradigm informed consent case the
clearer it becomes that informed consent has failed to shed its battery
antecedents. Rather, we see demonstrated a lackluster progress toward any
recognition of a duty to inform and disclose operating outside of the context
of consent to an intrusive procedure.
As such, an exceptional case is the California opinion of Truman v.
Thomas.17 There, the plaintiffs decedent consulted the defendant physician
during a six-year period. Allegedly, the defendant failed to inform her of the
risks of not having a pap smear test. Subsequently, the patient died of cervical
cancer at the age of thirty. The doctor argued that he had been under no duty
to disclose, because that duty applies "only where the patient consents to the
recommended procedure,"' 8 and that "patients who reject their physician's
advice should shoulder the burden of inquiry as to the possible consequences
of their decision. '""9 Rejecting that argument the court noted:
The duty to disclose was imposed ... so that patients might meaningfully
exercise their right to make decisions about their own bodies. The importance
of this right should not be diminished by the manner in which it is exercised.
Further, the need for disclosure is not lessened because patients reject a
recommended procedure. Such a decision does not alter "what has been
termed the fiducial qualities' of the physician-patient relationship," since
patients who reject a procedure are as unskilled in the medical sciences as
those who consent .... It must be remembered that Dr. Thomas was not
engaged in an arms-length transaction with Mrs. Truman. Clearly... he was
obliged to provide her with all the information material to her decision."
However, Truman remains a lonely voice. Far more typical are discouraging
pronouncements from torts judges to the effect that the doctrine of informed
consent applies only to surgical procedures and "has not been extended to
therapeutic treatment, which is usually an ongoing treatment upon examination
by the treating physician, where any change of condition can be diagnosed and
controlled."
21
17. 611 P.2d 902 (Cal. 1980).
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id. (citations omitted).
21. Malloy v. Shanahan, 421 A.2d 803, 804 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980). See also, Pratt v.
University of Minn. Affiliated Hosps. & Clinics, 414 N.W.2d 399, 402 (Minn. 1987) (no duty to
inform patient that diagnosis may be incorrect).
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Consistent with this approach is the recent California Supreme Court case
of Arato v. Avedon.22 There, the court held that a physician is not required
in every case to disclose the patient's statistical life expectancy.23 "Rather
than mandate the disclosure of specific information as a matter of law, the
better rule is to instruct the jury that a physician is under a legal duty to
disclose to the patient all material information ... needed to make an informed
decision regarding a proposed treatment."'24
The Arato court also held that the duty of disclosure involves information
related to the patient's medical decision making and not to :such matters as
estate planning. The plaintiff asserted that the patient would have ordered his
business affairs accordingly if he had known of his imminent demise.' The
court replied that "[t]he short answer to plaintiffs' claim is ... that a
'physician is not the patient's financial adviser."'' 26
Surely, however, if we are truly to shed light on Professor Katz's "silent
world" it should be through a more vigorous-indeed, as Katz himself puts it,
"punctilious"-promotion of the flow of information in all situations. That is,
tort law should earnestly be promoting such actions, not viewing them with
suspicion. Unfortunately, the failure of the courts to fashion a comprehensive
vision of information flow, to conceptualize the "information tort," has
condemned informed consent doctrine to merely affecting the quality of
"custody" and has done nothing for "liberty., 27
IV. IMPAIRED LIFE CASES
If the courts have been hesitant to move from informed consent to lack of
information, they have exhibited even more unease the further plaintiffs ask
them to stray from the paradigm. A good example is the sub-set of prenatal
injury fact-patterns that frequently are referred to as wrongful or impaired life
cases. 28 The typical situation is where a prenatal test allegedly would have
22. 858 P.2d 598 (Cal. 1993).
23. Id. at 140. The plaintiff's decedent in Arato was the victim of a particularly deadly form
of cancer, and the treatment undertaken by the defendant physicians was experimental, painful,
and of speculative curative value. Id. at 134. The plaintiff asserted that her husband would not
have undergone the treatment, but would instead have lived out his final days in comfort in the
bosom of his family, if he had known that his statistical life expectancy and the chances for the
therapy's success were both very limited. Id. at 135.
24. Id. at 140.
25. Id. at 141-42 (no duty to disclose every contingency that might affect the patient's
nonmedical rights and interests).
26. Id. at 141 (quoting Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 n.10 (1990)).
27. SILENT WORLD, supra note 1, at 49.
28. There is no little confusion concerning the terminology in these prenatal injury cases.
As a result we have suggested the following:
(i) Wrongful Life: An action brought by the child complaining of her social or financial
status in life or her very existence.
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diagnosed a genetic disorder presumably leading to a decision whether or not
to terminate the pregnancy. Generally speaking, courts have rushed into the
arms of no-duty language, and refused a child later born with such a genetic
defect any substantial recourse against an admittedly negligent doctor or
genetic testing laboratory.
The court's seeming unease in dealing with information torts and the
linkage between informed consent and impaired life can be illustrated by
reference to two cases: the first an under-appreciated informed consent case;
the latter a leading impaired life case.
In Shack v. Holland 9 plaintiffs-mother and son--claimed that as a
result of the defendant's negligent conduct and a lack of informed consent, the
son was born maimed and deformed. Realizing that it was dealing with the
confluence of informed consent and prenatal tort the court stated:
[T]he issues presented are whether a conditional prospective liability to a fetus
is created when an unborn child's mother is not sufficiently informed of the
risks, hazards and alternatives of the delivery procedure administered, and
whether such liability attaches upon the birth of the child and [enures] to the
benefit of the child in the nature of a cause'of action for the lack of informed
consent2O
For the court, and given the developments in prenatal tort recovery for
negligence, the real question was whether that right may be extended to
include an action for lack of informed consent.3' With minimal discussion
the court framed and resolved the issue as follows:
The court finds that although the obligation to disclose runs to the mother,
plaintiff... then unborn but within his mother's womb, comes within the area
of persons to be protected. The lack of informed consent of the mother would
have its effect upon the fetus to be born for good or ill. A child in its
mother's womb is a foreseeable circumstance. Conduct, which creates a risk
of harm to a woman, includes also a risk of harm to her unborn child. The
standard of care imposed upon the doctor by the statute [enures] to the benefit
of her unborn child. This is a classic example of derivative liability whereby
(ii) Impaired Life: An action brought by the child complaining that she suffers from a
physical impairment which, while not caused by the defendant, should have been
anticipated by the defendant prior to her conception or birth.
(iii) Wrongful Birth: An action brought by a parent complaining that her child suffers
from an impairment which, while not caused by, should have been anticipated by the
defendant prior to the child's conception or birth.
(iv) Wrongful Pregnancy: An action brought by a parent complaining that her child
would not have been conceived or born but for the negligence of the defendant.
JJ. PHILIPS ET AL., CASES, MATERA.. AND PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF TORTS 522 (1991).
29. 389 N.Y.S.2d 988 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).
30. Id. at 989.
31. Id. at 991.
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a plaintiff may institute an action to redress a wrong done to himself which is
proximately caused by a wrong done to another.32
In holding that a child may bring a postnatal wrongful life action for
breach of the duty to obtain informed consent when adequate information had
not been conveyed prenatally to his mother, the court set a path for recogniz-
ing the necessity for increasing the flow of information between doctor and
patient well beyond the paradigm. Unfortunately, this opinion did not promote
the further development of the doctrine; a fault that lies not so much in Shack
itself, but in the opinions in subsequent wrongful birth and wrongful life cases
that failed to make the conceptual link between the fact patterns.
To an extent that link was made by the Supreme Court of California in
Turpin v. Sortini,33 though the court failed to exploit it to the full. Hope
Turpin was examined by the defendant, a specialist in the diagnosis of speech
and hearing defects. She was diagnosed as having normal hearing although,
in fact, she was deaf because of a hereditary ailment. After the allegedly
negligent diagnosis, but prior to learning of Hope's deafness, the Turpins
conceived a second child who subsequently was born suffering from the same
hereditary deafness. The Turpins alleged that they would not have had the
second child if they had known of the risk of the hereditary ailment before the
child's conception. The court was relatively untroubled by the parents' cause
of action for wrongful birth, 3' noting that "[tihe overwhelming majority of
recent cases have permitted parents to recover at least some elements of
damage in such actions.
'0 5
However, the court was more hesitant regarding the allegation of wrongful
life by the Turpins' second child. Prior courts disapproving of such a cause
of action had cited two primary reasons for disallowing recovery: a conclusory
view that the child had suffered no "legally cognizable injury," and the
difficulty/impossibility of ascertaining damages in such cases.
36
32. Id. at 993.
33. 643 P.2d 954 (Cal. 1982).
34. See supra note 28 (defining wrongful birth).
35. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 957. Cf Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744-45 (Mo. 1988) (en
banc), denying the parents' claim and stating:
A reading of all of the cases persuades us that the real underlying problem in these cases
stems from the fact that the courts have either closed their eyes to traditional tort
causation, or have leaped over causation ....
The heart of the problem in these cases is that the physician cannot be said to have
caused the defect. The disorder is genetic and not the result of any injury negligently
inflicted by the doctor. In addition it is incurable and was incurable from the moment of
conception. Thus the doctor's alleged negligent failure to detect it during prenatal
examination cannot be considered a cause of the condition by analogy to those cases in
which the doctor has failed to make a timely diagnosis of a curable disease. The child's
handicap is an inexorable result of conception and birth.
36. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807 (N.Y. 1978).
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In discussing the child's cause of action, there can be little doubt that the
California Supreme Court viewed information flow as at the root of the issue.
Indeed, the court volunteered the answer to one of the logical problems
inherent in the fact pattern-how can the fetus be supplied with informa-
tion-when it stated:
Of course, in the wrongful life context, the unborn child cannot personally
make any choice as to the relative value of life or death. At that stage,
however, just as in the case of an infant after birth, the law generally accords
the parents the right to act to protect the child's interests. As the wrongful
birth decisions recognize, when a doctor or other medical care provider
negligently fails to diagnose an hereditary problem, parents are deprived of the
opportunity to make an informed and meaningful decision whether to conceive
and bear a handicapped child .... Although in deciding whether or not to
bear such a child parents may properly, and undoubtedly do, take into account
their own interests, parents also presumptively consider the interests of their
future child. Thus, when a defendant negligently fails to diagnose an
hereditary ailment, he harms the potential child as well as the parents by
depriving the parents of information which may be necessary to determine
whether it is in the child's own interest to be born with defects or not to be
born at all.
37
Notwithstanding, the Turpin court ultimately denied recovery on the basis that
there was no rational means for the jury to assess damages for pain and
suffering, or for the difference between the plaintiff's condition and what it
would have been in the absence of negligence.
In so doing, the court rejected the view of an intermediate appellate court
that would simply reference the plaintiff's condition after birth.38 The court
summarized its disagreement as follows:
[I]n fixing damages in a tort case the jury generally compares the condition
plaintiff would have been in but for the tort, with the position the plaintiff is
in now, compensating the plaintiff for what has been lost as a result of the
wrong. Although the valuation of pain and suffering or emotional distress in
terms of dollars and cents is unquestionably difficult in an ordinary personal
injury action, jurors at least have some frame of reference in their own general
experience to appreciate what the plaintiff has lost-normal life without pain
and suffering. In a wrongful life action that simply is not the case, for what
the plaintiff has "lost" is not life without pain and suffering but rather the
unknowable status of never having been born. In this context, a rational,
nonspeculative determination of a specific monetary award in accordance with
normal tort principles appears to be outside the realm of human competence.39
37. Turpin, 643 P.2d at 962 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
38. Curlender v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 165 Cal. Rptr. 477 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
39. Turpin. 643 P.2d at 964.
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Compare the traditional intrusive procedure-type informed consent case. Is not
the same damage assessment issue present? Courts seem sanguine about
allowing the jury to compare the condition of the patient (now suffering from
the non-informed and incurred risk) with the patient as she was prior to the
procedure despite of uncertainty as to what would have happened absent the
procedure.40 Why are such approximations outside the competence of juries
in the conceptually similar impaired life cases?
Of course, judicial reticence in impaired life cases may be explainable on
the basis they have become embroiled in the abortion debate.4 However, it
is at least arguable that, once again, the further our courts move away from the
battery paradigm, the less satisfactorily they deal with the questions of
information flow, real consent, and real autonomy. The tentative conclusion
is that while courts may have said that they were retiring the law of battery,
that retirement has been strictly symbolic.
V. CONCLUSION
Torts lawyers and the judicial authors of the seminal informed consent
cases continue to be flattered by their inclusion in the autonomy debate.
However, they should be confined to the most historical of footnotes lest too
much be made of informed consent, reading into it a philosophical and ethical
content that, today, is simply not there.
Obviously, it does not follow that the doctrine of informed consent should
not have a fully developed ethical structure, merely that it does not. Even if
bio-ethicists have little to gain from examining contemporary tort law, it does
not follow that torts lawyers will not gain from taking up a more enlightened
notion of informed consent. Indeed, attempting to inject a pervasive sense of
autonomy into "tort think" might provide some of the over-arching conceptual
bridges to developing a more sophisticated view of information torts.
40. This issue is what one references to begin the restitution in integrum quantification
calculation. It is distinct from the question whether the patient would still have undertaken the
procedure if she had been informed of the risks. See, e.g., Arena v. Gingrich, 748 P.2d 547 (Or.
1988); Cheung v. Cunningham, 520 A.2d 832 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
41. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8305 (Purdon Supp. 1989).
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